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NOTE
THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH DOMESTICATION STATUTES
Corporation A, doing business in various states throughout the country,
has installed local agents for the transacting of its business in two adjacent
states, X and Y, neither of which is its state of incorporation. The local
agent in X makes a contract for the sale of the corporation's goods to a
local buyer, who subsequently refuses to pay for them; in Y the local agent
deliberately withholds from the corporation monies collected for goods
sold to local buyers. In a suit by the corporation against the buyer in X
recovery may be had if the corporation pays certain fees and files certain
papers in that state; 1 but recovery in the second action, for monies to
which it would otherwise be equally entitled, is absolutely denied.2 Cor-
poration B, similarly engaged in multistate commerce through local agents,
requires all locally negotiated contracts for the sale of its goods to be
accepted and verified by its office in its state of incorporation. When a
buyer of its goods in one state defaults in payment, the corporation may
sue in that state to collect the amounts due without filing or paying fees; 3
yet in another state the same business procedures may result in the cor-
poration being brought into the court of each county in which its local
agent dealt on its behalf, in an attempt to subject it to substantial fines
for its conduct in each.4
Such diverse treatment of essentially identical conduct by a corporation
doing business in a state other than that of its incorporation-a consequence
of our federal system-is indicative of the problem facing any corporation
venturesome enough to do business outside its state of incorporation. This
same diversity accounts for the difficulties involved in any attempt to
generalize as to the legal consequences attendant upon the failure of foreign
corporations to comply with domestication statutes. 5
I. STATE POWER To REQUIRE DOMESTICATION
Today, multistate operation by a corporation is commonplace. This
fact, coupled with the fictitious nature of corporate existence, presents
1 J. R. Watkins Co. v. Floyd, 119 So. 2d 164 (La. Ct App. 1960).
2J. .. Watkins Medical Co. v. Williams, 124 Ark. 539, 187 S.W. 653 (1916).
a Alexander Film Co. v. Pierce, 46 N.M. 110, 121 P.2d 940 (1942).
4 Alexander Film Co. v. State, 201 Ark. 1052, 147 S.W.2d 1011 (1941).
5 For purposes of this Note, a "foreign" corporation is any private corporation
for profit, exclusive of special-purpose corporations such as insurance or banking
companies, which is incorporated in a state other than the one about whose domesti-
cation law a given controversy revolves.
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peculiar problems regarding the ability of a corporation to act beyond the
bounds of the state giving it life-problems early posed by the Supreme
Court's holding in Bank of Augusta v. Earle 6 that a corporation was not
entitled to the same ambulatory privileges as a citizen and could not freely
do business beyond the geographical confines of its domicile. Despite the
obvious fact that geographical lines are inherently unwieldly and unrealistic
for determining legal controls over corporate activity-particularly in an
economy as mobile as our own-the states have traditionally been quite
free to pursue their own best interests by restricting the entrance of, re-
quiring information from, governing the actions of, and assuring their
share of revenue from, corporate entities created by sister sovereignties.
7
It is the purpose of this Note to examine the legal incidents stemming from
state exercise of this "exclusionary" 8 power today, and to appraise the
efficacy of the various techniques employed in achieving state goals.
At the outset two observations must be made. First, a matter of
delimitation. The registration or domestication of foreign corporations
consists at least of filing certain documents regarding the corporate char-
acter,9 paying fees for the privilege of doing business in the state,10 ap-
pointing someone in that state upon whom service of process can be made,"
638 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), established the basis for geo-
graphical influence by holding that the states may permit foreign corporations to do
local business "upon such terms and conditions as those States may think proper to
impose." Id. at 181.8 Though, technically, states have the power to "exclude' foreign corporations
from doing business within their boundaries, it is very late in history to accept this
formulation as realistic. See Note, The Adoption of the Liberal Theory of Foreign
Corporations-(Il) The Functional Capacity of a Foreign Corporation, 79 U. P.&.
L. REv. 1119 (1931); Comment, 1961 DUKE L.J. 274, 276-77.
9 E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-1004 (Supp. 1960) (name of state of
incorporation and information about share structure).
3
0 E.g., Oiaio REv. CODE ANN. § 1703.09 (Page 1954) (based on number of
issued shares represented in the state). The failure either to file or to pay the tax
can result in revocation of the certificate of authority to do local business. E.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 33-409 (Supp. 1959). But if no disability attends failure
to meet these annual requirements, courts may be unwilling to penalize a corporation
to the extent of allowing third parties to avoid contractual liability because of such
failure. It has been explained that the omission of sanctions means that none was
intended. Smith Rolfe Co. v. Wallace, 41 Okla. 643, 139 Pac. 248 (1914) ; cf. Port-
land Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Early, 42 Wash. 2d 273, 254 P.2d 758 (1953) (third
party may not go behind state-issued certificate to demonstrate that insufficient fees
were paid).
11 This requirement is found in every state and the District of Columbia. E.g.,
ARK. STAT. § 64-1201 (1957) (secretary of state or agent) ; D.C. CODE AN. §§ 29-933
(g) - (i) (Supp. 1960) (individual or corporation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:15-3(c)
(1939) (domestic corporation or natural person). Usually, appointment of an agent
for service of process is one element of domestication, and failure to make such an
appointment is covered by a general clause relating to disabilities for noncompliance.
E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.720 (1952). The statutory sanction has been applied
even where the failure to appoint an agent has not been accompanied by any other
domestication omissions. Wiley Elec. Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 167 Miss.
842, 147 So. 773 (1933). However, a defendant may, under some circumstances, be
estopped from raising this defense. Eastlick v. Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co., 33
Axiz. 242, 263 Pac. 936 (1928). A corporation may commonly be subjected to suit
in a jurisdiction where it has done business, even though it has not expressly ap-
pointed an agent for service, for the doing of business without such an express appoint-
ment will be deemed an appointment of the secretary of state as its agent for this
purpose. E.g., OKa. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.17 (1953).
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and perhaps repeating some of these acts in the specific county in which
the corporation intends to settle. 2 Insofar as the purposes of these re-
quirements vary, it would be possible for state legislatures to provide
various disabilities or penalties for noncompliance. Or, absent such express
directions, it would not be surprising to find the judiciary suiting a par-
ticular punishment to a particular form of noncompliance. In fact, such
legislative and judicial efforts are common.13 For purposes of this Note,
however, only complete failure to do any of the acts required by local law
will be classed as noncompliance. Any partial compliance, and the nature
of it, will be clearly labeled. Second, a matter of jurisdiction. There
lingers in this field a problem stemming from our parallel system of
federal and state courts. Before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 14 it was possible
for a foreign corporation denied access to state courts for the enforcement
of its claims to turn to the federal courts to secure the desired relief, pro-
vided the necessary jurisdictional requirements were met.15 Now, however,
in cases based on diversity of citizenship, each federal court is to apply the
law of the state in which it sits, including the statute barring a foreign
corporation from suit.' 6 Thus, the policies of the state evinced through
the domestication laws and their interpretation are recognized and respected
by the federal judiciary.'
7
Before attempting to explore the effects of noncompliance, inquiry
must focus on the kinds of conduct that require a corporation to qualify
to do business in a state other than that of its incorporation, the kinds of
conduct that will subject a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of such
a state, variations among the statutes, according to their purposes, as to
the degree and intensity of conduct required, and constitutional limitations
on the ability of states to deal with intruding foreign corporations. These
issues have been raised so repeatedly that the principles generally applied
in resolving them are readily available. Unfortunately, however, both
principles and resolutions serve more to label a result than to explicate the
rationale for achieving it.
A foreign corporation going into a state and erecting a manufacturing
plant for the local production, distribution, and sale of its goods would
clearly be required to domesticate. Its conduct would amount to "doing
12E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-501 (Supp. 1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-33
(1959).
13 See, e.g., Association Collectors, Inc. v. Hardman, 2 Wash. 2d 414, 98 P.2d
318 (1940).
14 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
15 David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America, 225 U.S. 489 (1912).
16 Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). Compare Hicks Body
Co. v. Ward Body Works, Inc., 233 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1956), with Hunter Packing
Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 98 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Ill. 1948). Diversity of
citizenship accounts for the majority of cases that reach federal courts in regard to
these matters, often by removal from state courts.
17 See Note, Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts Over Foreign Corporations,
69 HAmv. L. Rzv. 508, 520-24 (1956); cf. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 191-92
(1947).
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business" locally and it would be subject to the jurisdiction of local courts.
The state has a legitimate interest in making certain demands of a cor-
poration engaged, or proposing to engage, in "intrastate activities" before
allowing it to take advantage of local facilities for police protection, to draw
on the local labor force, to contract with local citizens and concerns, to use
the state courts, and to do all those things that a local association, similarly
situated, would not be entitled to do without complying with the analogous
requirements for domestic incorporation.' 8 At the other extreme, it is
almost as clear that a corporation which receives by mail from an out-of-
state citizen, at its office in its state of incorporation, a single order for a
particular item, which it then mails to that buyer, would not have to comply
with the domestication laws of that state as a condition precedent to suing
the buyer and would probably not be amenable to service of process in the
buyer's state. For these purposes it has done no business in that state.
Between these extremes lies the factual 19 continuum on which may be
placed countless decisions 20 that must face the question of whether certain
conduct constitutes "intrastate business" 21 or "doing business" 22 or "not
18 See Hill-Lanham, Inc. v. Lightview Dev. Corp., 163 F. Supp. 475 (D.D.C.
1957). An excellent expression of one aspect of the state's interest in domestication
is the following dictum from Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Ranney-Davis Mercantile
Co., 173 F.2d 844, 847 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 930 (1949) :
All legislation making foreign corporations amenable to judicial process in
the state in which they seek the privilege of doing business is predicated upon
the right of the state to protect its citizens in their controversies with such
corporations by requiring that the same be adjudicated in the courts of the
state rather than compelling its citizens to travel to remote places to litigate
such controversies.
'9 Whether a corporation is doing business within the terms of a local domestica-
tion statute is always a question of fact. E.g., Brown v. Farmer & Ochs Co., 209 F.2d
703, 706 (6th Cir. 1954).
.20 "The published decisions on what constitutes 'doing business' in a State by a
foreign corporation are literally legion." Echeverry v. Kellogg Switchboard &
Supply Co., 175 F.2d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1949).
2
1 Held to constitute intrastate activity so as to bar the action of plaintiff corpo-
ration: Cohn-Hall-Marx Co. v. Feinberg, 214 Minn. 584, 8 N.W.2d 825 (1943)
(contract; negotiations leading to contract carried on by resident agent); Case v.
Mills Novelty Co., 187 Miss. 673, 193 So. 625 (1940) (replevin; local servicing of
machine sold) ; United Artists Corp. v. Board of Censors, 189 Tenn. 397, 225 S.W.2d
550 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 952 (1950) (judicial review; foreign corporation
sharing in profits from local exhibition); Holleb Liquor Distribs., Inc. v. Lincoln
Fireproof Warehouse Co., 223 Wis. 231, 270 N.W. 545 (1936) (conversion; contract
of assignment of converted property to foreign corporation made in state after property
had come to rest there).
22While there appears to be no legal significance in the phrase used-"intrastate,"
"local," or "doing business"-a distinction may be noted between the amount of local
activity that will be "doing business" for service of process on a foreign corporation
or for substituted service on the secretary of state, and the sometimes greater
amount that will require the corporation to domesticate in order to maintain a suit.
See Keane & Collins, Changing Concepts of What Constitutes "Doing Business" by
Foreign Corporations, 42 MARQ. L. REv. 151, 160-62 (1958); 26 GEo. WAsH. L. Ray.
735, 737 n.21 (1958). Compare Toedman v. Nooter Corp., 180 Kan. 703, 308 P.2d
138 (1957), and Malavasi v. Villavecchia, 62 N.J. Super. 510, 163 A.2d 214 (Super.
Ct. 1960), with William L. Bonnell Co. v. Katz, 23 Misc. 2d 1028, 196 N.Y.S.2d 763
(Sup. Ct. 1960), and Knight Prods., Inc. v. Donnen-Fuel Co., 20 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup.
Ct. 1940).
The difference between forbidding access by foreign corporations to the
court of the state, because of their failure to comply with the statutory
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doing business" 23 for the particular issue being litigated. "[D]etermina-
provisions for doing business therein, and . . . providing for service on a
designated agent where, without complying with the statute, they undertake
to do business in the state . . . is that, while the former is strictly con-
strued so that the exclusion from access to the courts of the state requires a
strong showing that the statute has been violated, the latter is liberally con-
strued since otherwise citizens of the state would be forced to resort to another
jurisdiction in order to maintain suits ....
Mississippi Wood Preserving Co. v. Rothschild, 201 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 1953).
And again, what would be sufficient to require domestication might be inadequate
to subject the corporation to penalties for noncompliance. Compare State ex rel.
Independence County v. Tad Screen Advertising Co., 199 Ark. 205, 133 S.W.2d 1
(1939) (penalty recoverable where interstate acts are "incidental" to intrastate activ-
ity), with Murray Tool & Supply Co. v. State, 203 Ark. 874, 159 S.W.2d 71 (1942)
(statute should not be used unless it is quite clear that acts constitute doing busi-
ness). The quality or quantity of acts done locally which are sufficient to allow
service of process in one form or another have been exhaustively discussed, see, e.g.,
McMenomy v. Wonder Bldg. Corp. of America, 188 F. Supp. 213 (D. Minn. 1960);
Gearhart v. WSAZ, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Ky. 1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 242 (6th
Cir. 1958), and will not be elaborated here. The most important recent case is
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). That case effectively
abandoned all former constitutional tests for determining the validity of a state's
assertion of jurisdiction over corporations and substituted the criterion of "certain
minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' Id. at 316. The examples of
activity required for service of process in this and the following footnote may provide
a basis for comparison with the activity requiring compliance with domestication laws,
but, as will be seen, clear lines of demarcation can scarcely be said to exist.
Held to constitute doing business for service of process: Republic Supply Corp. v.
Lewyt Corp., 160 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Mich. 1958) (distributor contract with co-
promotion and local control) ; Ultra Sucro Co. v. Illinois Water Treatment Co., 146
F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (local office); De Golia v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 140 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (activity of coconspirators) ; Mc-
Clanahan v. Trans-America Ins. Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 171, 307 P.2d 1023 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1957) (investigating and defending suits); Malavasi v. Villavecchia, supra
(local product test) ; Arco Welding & Mach. Works, Inc. v. Terry Contracting, Inc.,
44 N.J. Super. 586, 131 A.2d 316 (Super. Ct. 1957) (signing a contract); Eclipse
Fuel Eng'r Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 736, 307 P.2d 739 (Dist. Ct. App.
1957) (dictum) (substantial regular business through agency or independent
contractor).
Held to constitute doing business so as to require presuit domestication: Davis v.
Asano Bussan Co., 212 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1954) (unloading and selling distress
cement); Midwest Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Baraboo Chamber of Commerce, 161 F.2d
918 (7th Cir. 1947) (executing a contract) ; In re Bell Lumber, 149 F.2d 980 (7th
Cir. 1945) (hiring local architects and supervising construction) ; Reliance Fertilizer
Co. v. Davis, 124 Fla. 859, 169 So. 579 (1936) (sales through local agents) ; Thomas v.
Hudson Sales Corp., 204 Md. 450, 105 A.2d 225 (1954) (supervision and control of
car sales and service); Viking Equip. Co. v. Central Hotel Co., 230 Mo. App. 304,
91 S.W.2d 94 (1936) (installation of sprinkler system); Manhattan Terrazzo Brass
Strip Co. v. A. Benzing & Sons, 72 Ohio App. 116, 50 N.E.2d 570 (1943) (establish-
ment of local corporation to merchandise as agent). The performance of the duties
of an assignee for the benefit of creditors would constitute doing business locally.
Crites v. Associated Frozen Foods Packers, 190 Ore. 585, 227 P._d 821 (1951).
23 Held not to constitute doing business for service of process: Anderson v.
British Overseas Airways Corp., 144 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (cosubsidiary's
presence within state not defendant's); Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63
Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945) (consignment sales with factoring arrangement);
Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Hawkins, 352 P.2d 314 (Hawaii 1960) (local representation
without agency contract); Arundel Crane Serv., Inc. v. Thew Shovel Co., 214 Md.
387, 135 A.2d 428 (1957) (local sale through independent dealer) ; Zeidler v. Johnson,
346 Mich. 203, 77 N.W.2d 756 (1956) (corporation president lives within state and
confers about company matters there) ; Garber v. Bancamerica-Blair Corp., 205 Minn.
275, 285 N.W. 723 (1939) (independent subsidiary within state plus local phone
listing). Compare N.C. GEm. STAT. § 55-145(b) (1960), which purports to make a
foreign parent subject to service through the local subsidiary, with Fitzgerald v.
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tion of the applicable rule presents no serious difficulty. Application of the
rule to given facts, however, often does." 24
Increasingly legislatures are attempting to lighten the judicial load
by statutes declaring that certain acts do not constitute doing business so
as to require domestication 25 or equating certain conduct with a doing of
local business for amenability to service of process. 26 The utility or neces-
sity of the former may be questioned where they comprise no more than
existing precedents 27 or a list of activities which no court today would
seriously consider sufficient to require domestication.28  And the success
of the jurisdiction statutes in reducing litigation is questionable if Minne-
sota's experience is illustrative,2 9 for attempts to extend jurisdiction to the
constitutional limits may raise new problems for the courts without provid-
ing automatic answers to the old.
There are several principles which serve to limit the exercise of state
power over foreign corporations with respect to domestication requirements.
One, based on the commerce clause of the federal constitution, is that
Hilton Hotels Corp., 183 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1960), which held a parent cor-
poration cannot be served to gain jurisdiction over an independent foreign subsidiary.
Held not to constitute doing business so as to require presuit domestication:
Hieston v. National City Bank, 132 Md. 389, 104 Atl. 281 (1918) (bringing suit);
Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 325 Mich. 699, 39 N.W.2d 341 (1949) (intercorporate
consolidation arrangement drawn up in state) ; Whitney v. Dudley, 40 N.Y.S.2d 838
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 266 App. Div. 1056, 45 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1943) (execution and mail-
ing of contract) ; Knight Prods., Inc. v. Donnen-Fuel Co., 20 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct.
1940) (shipping coal into state and storing there) ; Taylor v. State, 29 Wash. 2d 638,
188 P.2d 671 (1948) (bringing suit for declaratory judgment); Niblack v. Seaberg
Hotel Co., 42 N.M. 281, 76 P.2d 1156 (1938) (acting as trustee) (dictum). "[lit is
the exercising of its corporate franchises and maintenance of a place of business
within the state in the sense that corporations organized and doing business under
the laws of this state maintain such places of business . . . ." William L. Bonnell
Co. v. Katz, 23 Misc. 2d 1028, 1031, 196 N.Y.S.2d 763, 767 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
24 Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 552, 99 N.W.2d 670, 677 (1959).
25 E.g., ALASKA Comp. LAws ANN. § 36-2A-141 (Supp. 1958); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 33-397(b) (Supp. 1959); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-22-01 (Supp. 1961).
2 6 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 854 (1958).
27 See Comment, 32 TEXAS L. REv. 211, 213 (1954).
2 8E.g., Oregon lists the following: (1) maintaining or defending an action or
arbitration or settling a suit; (2) holding directors' meetings or other internal cor-
porate activities; (3) maintaining bank accounts; (4) keeping transfer offices for
security dealings; (5) making sales through independent contractors; (6) soliciting
orders which become binding outside the state; (7) creating mortgages or liens;
(8) enforcing property rights; (9) doing interstate business; (10) engaging in isolated
transactions. ORE. REv. STAT. § 57.655(2) (1959).
29 Minnesota added a new section to its statute in 1957 which reads as follows:
"If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Minnesota to be per-
formed . . . in Minnesota, or if such foreign corporation commits a tort . . . in
Minnesota against a resident of Minnesota, such acts shall be deemed doing business
in Minnesota . . . " MiNN. STAT. ANN. §303.13(3) (Supp. 1960). So far the
following cases have attempted to construe the statute: Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons
Press Sales, 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960); McMenomy v. Wonder Bldg. Corp.
of America, 188 F. Supp. 213 (D. Minn. 1960); Dahlberg Co. v. American Sound
Prods., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 928 (D. Minn. 1959) ; Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp.
416 (D. Minn. 1959); Paulos v. Best Sec., Inc., 109 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1961);
Adamek v. Michigan Door Co., 108 N.W.2d 607 (Minn. 1961); Dahlberg Co. v.
Western Hearing Aid Center, 107 N.W.2d 381 (Minn.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 961
(1961); Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888
(1960); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
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states cannot unduly burden interstate commerce.30 Another, relating to
federal supremacy, is that federal corporations are not "foreign" and there-
fore fall outside the purview of these state statutes.31 A third, largely
derived from older precedents, is that the doing of a single act or
isolated transaction will not amount to the doing of business sufficient to
require domestication.
3 2
Despite the fascinating subtlety or bewilderment with which these
rules may be applied, their interpretation and interplay are not the subject
of this Note. Out of the annual plethora of cases, this Note shall concern
itself with those that preliminarily find the corporation has acted in such
a way as to come within the state's regulatory jurisdiction and that are not
disposed of on the basis of some self-limitation on that jurisdiction.
II. PENAL AND INJUNCTIVE SANCTIONS
State legislatures commonly provide for a fine to be levied upon a
foreign corporation for either engaging in local business before domestica-
tion 33 or failing to file the requisite documents.3 4  Provision is ordinarily
made for some state official to bring suit to collect the penalty amounts,
and, short of a defense that the corporation was not doing business in the
state at all,35 few problems are ever encountered in the process.36
30 See Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914) ; Palmer v. Aeolian Co.,
46 F.2d 746 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 851 (1931) ; Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v.
Hackert, 80 F. Supp. 837 (S.D. Iowa 1948); Weber Showcase & Fixture Co. v.
Co-ed Shop, 47 Ariz. 415, 56 P.2d 667 (1936). Compare Cadden-Allen, Inc. v. Trans-
Lux News Sign Corp., 254 Ala. 400, 48 So. 2d 428 (1950), with Loudenville Milling
Co. v. Davis, 251 Ala. 459, 37 So. 2d 659 (1948).
31 E.g., Bezat v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 55 Ariz. 85, 98 P.2d 852 (1940).
32 See Monaghan & Murphy Bank v. Davis, 27 Ariz. 532, 234 Pac. 818 (1925);
Crockin v. Boston Store, 137 Fla. 853, 188 So. 853 (1939) ; Reynolds Offset Co. v.
Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 156 A.2d 737 (Super. Ct. 1959), certification denied,
31 N.J. 554, 158 A.2d 453 (1960). The extension of judicial jurisdiction on the basis
of a single act, see Note, Single Act Statutes and Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corpora-
tions, 43 VA. L. REv. 1105 (1957), may indicate that this principle is on the wane.
33 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21(92) (Supp. 1959); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.20
(1947).
34 E.g., ARE:. STAT. § 64-1202 (1957) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 613.11 (1956) ; HAWAII
REV. LAWS § 174-10 (1955). The significance of the difference between these two
types of statutes is illustrated by Kentucky Straight Creek Coal Co. v. Common-
wealth, 304 Ky. 247, 200 S.W.2d 470 (1947), in which venue was determined by the
place of doing business because the violation was the doing of business and not, as
defendant urged, the failure to file.
35 Although the concept of doing business may be stretched or abandoned where
the issue is the validity of service of process and the court's exercise of judicial juris-
diction, see Note, supra note 32, when it comes to construe this kind of penal statute,
a court may be inclined toward a more rigorous construction, see Murray Tool &
Supply Co. v. State, 203 Ark. 874, 159 S.W.2d 71 (1942). But cf. State ex reL.
Independence County v. Tad Screen Advertising Co., 199 Ark. 205, 133 S.W.2d 1
(1939). See generally 17 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONs § 8515 (rev. vol. 1960).
36 Defenses based on technical defects in the statutes have frequently been asserted,
seldom successfully. Corporations have vainly contended that suit was improperly
brought by a city solicitor where the statute required its institution by the county
solicitor, Tennessee Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. State, 99 Ala. 197, 13 So. 687
(1892), that criminal rather than civil procedure was required by a statute subjecting
noncomplying foreign corporations to a "fine," State ex rel. Jones v. Howe Scale Co.,
1961]
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The fines imposed on noncomplying foreign corporations vary in
amount 37 and as to the basis according to which they are calculated
3 8
Obviously they serve both a revenue and-depending upon the size of the
fine-a deterrent function.39  But it must be recognized that the deterrent
effect of any fixed penalty is inversely proportional to the size of the
corporation involved. A large fine may well serve to filter out small,
financially tenuous corporations. So far as domestication's informational
function is concerned this selective deterrence might provide adequate pro-
tection for local citizens, as the financial soundness of larger companies
can often be ascertained by potential creditors despite a failure to file
locally. Furthermore, the greater resources of these companies assure a
margin of security against the eventuality of litigation with local citizens.
Nevertheless, ten states 4o and the District of Columbia 41 have recently
enacted statutes assessing an amount equal to the fees and franchise taxes
182 Mo. App. 658, 166 S.W. 328 (1914), and that the proceeding was illegal because
the penalties collected were to become a part of the state's general funds, State ex re.
Lay v. Arthur Greenfield, Inc., 205 S.W. 619 (Mo. 1918). On the other hand, a
recodification of state law may provide an opportunity to preclude the state from
asserting penalties accrued under the old statute if the new law is an effective repeal
by substitution, rather than a mere cumulation, of the old provisions. See State ex rel
Williamson v. Empire Oil Corp., 353 P.2d 130 (Okla. 1960). See also Opinion of
Arizona Attorney General, March 24, 1959, 2 CCH CoRP. L. GUIDE 1[ 9919 (June 9,
1959), construing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-104 (Supp. 1960). The use of this distinction
to justify excusing prior illegal conduct is unconvincing where there is, for example,
a revision of the penal amount from a set figure to a range which includes the prior
amount as the upper limit. See People v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, 150 Mich.
563, 114 N.W. 350 (1907). However, an unexpressed factor in such decisions may
be judicial reluctance to permit the possibility of the state ignoring prolonged illegal
conduct in order to assess at some later date a more sizable penalty. (In People v.
Crucible Steel Co. of America, vcpra, the penalty under the old statute, mounting
at the rate of $1,000 per month, totaled $61,000 by the time of trial.) So confined,
the policy reasons for forgiving prior illegalities would be absent in cases in which the
state had not been lax for an unreasonable length of time. Then the state should
be entitled to recover despite the corporate defendant's subsequent compliance with the
domestication statute, see State ex rel. Nelson v. S. P. Pond Co., 135 Mo. App. 81, 85,
115 S.W. 505 (1909) ("Subsequent obedience to temporal laws does not pardon prior
violations. That is a divine law, but corporations having no souls to save [citing
Blackstone] . . . have neither necessity nor right to invoke it."), or a legislative
redefinition of the illegality and its accompanying penalties.
37 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 349 (1953) (range); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23,
§ 91(d) (1957) (flat sum); NEv. REv. STAT. § 80.210 (1957) (specified minimum);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §300:7 (1955) (specified maximum). Compare GA. CODE
ANN. § 22-1506 (Supp. 1958) ($100, remittable upon subsequent compliance if original
noncompliance was innocent), with IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-314 (1960) (up to $10,000).
38 See Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.990(2) (1959) (calculated per offense); S.C. CODE
§ 12-737 (1952) (calculated per diem); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 8.18 (1956)
(calculated per month).
39 Of course, many of the activities that violate local statutes are such isolated
transactions that qualification might reasonably have been thought to be unnecessary.
Little deterrent effect will exist under these circumstances, no matter how large
the penalty.
4 0
ALASKA Con'. LAws ANN. §§ 36-2A-159 (Supp. 1958); Colo. Sess. Laws
1959, ch. 83, § 119(3) : CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 33-412(c) (Supp. 1959) ; ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 32, § 157.125 (Smith-Hurd 1954); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-154(c) (1960);
N.D. CENT. CODE 10-22-19 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.201(b) (1953);
ORE. REv. STAT. § 57.745(3) (1959); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8.18(c) (1956) ;
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.847(3) (1957).
41 D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-934f(c) (Supp. 1959).
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which would have been imposed had the corporation qualified upon first
entering the state, plus either some further small penalty or a percentage
of the accrued amount. This is a logical way to calculate the amount of
the corporation's liability and, insofar as the penalty varies directly with
the offender's size, it will, unlike a fixed fine, bar both large and small
foreign entities with equal selectivity.
Either in conjunction with or in lieu of the imposition of a fine, the
state may label the conducting of precompliance business a misdemeanor.2
No special consequences ordinarily flow from this appellation. 43
A few jurisdictions give the state attorney general standing to sue out
an injunction against further local activity by an undomesticated foreign
corporation.4 4 Vermont has tempered this by authorizing discontinuance
of such a suit upon subsequent compliance by the corporation 4 5  This
restraint is consistent with the use of these laws to compel disclosure of
relevant information rather than to punish or banish the offending corpora-
tion; it may also indicate a recognition that many, if not most, violations
are unwitting. The same policy is evident in the many statutes providing
for the reinstatement of a foreign corporation denied the privilege of carry-
ing on local activity if it subsequently complies.46
III. DISABILITIEs
The most important of the possible consequences of a foreign cor-
poration's failure to domesticate is the likelihood that it will be denied
access to the state's courts or find its obligations in that state impaired.
The insecurity injected into normal business activities by the threat of
unenforceability usually provides a sufficient incentive to domesticate.
47
4 2 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, §21(94) (Supp. 1960); MONT. RFv. CODE S ANN.
§ 15-1705 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-1014 (1958).
43But see Hutterian Brethren v. Haas, 116 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mont. 1953), dis-
cussed in note 149 infra.
44 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 181, § 19 (1955); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 300:7
(1955); N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw §219; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §861 (1958). The
Massachusetts statute authorizes an injunction only "until compliance," whereas the
New Hampshire provision, clearly labeled a "penalty," seems to permit a permanent
injunction against all further business in the state by the offending corporation, not-
withstanding any possible later willingness to domesticate. The authorized scope
of injunctions under the other two statutes is problematical, and there is no case law
to shed light on the question. Where there is no statute giving injunctive powers
for the specific purpose of banishing undomesticated foreign corporations, the same
result might be achieved by quo warranto, see State ex rel. Attorney General v.
Western Mut. Life & Acc. Soc'y, 47 Ohio St. 167, 24 N.E. 392 (1890) (dictum),
although there seems to be no reported case in which the writ was employed success-
fully to oust a foreign corporation whose sole offense was failure to domesticate, except
perhaps State ex rel. Crossland v. Omaha & C.B. Ry. & B., 91 Iowa 517, 60 N.W. 121
(1894), in which the corporation was given 60 days to comply or be ousted.
45 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 862 (1958).
46 See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. §80.170 (Supp. 1959); OHio REV. CoDe ANN.
§ 1703.29(B) (Page 1954). Significantly, Vermont has no such procedure. Compare
text accompanying note 45 supra.
4 7 The inability to enforce contracts "in what may be the only jurisdiction in
which defendant is amenable to service of process, is a substantial penalty indeed."
Unlicensed Foreign Corporations-Enforcement of Contracts, 23 Coat. J. 23 (1960).
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Ignoring minor verbal differences, this kind of state control of precom-
pliance commercial activity today consists of enactments that (1) declare
all acts by an undomesticated foreign corporation void,48 (2) bar all
suits by an offending corporation on transactions arising out of such ac-
tivity,49 (3) withhold the right to maintain any action on intrastate trans-
actions until compliance,50 or (4) deny access to the courts for any
purpose until compliance.51 Two common supplementary provisions
preserve the right to defend suits while declaring precompliance contracts
not invalid 52 and set the same disabilities upon assignees of any right or
claim as apply to the foreign assignor.
53
There are a limited number of factual contexts in which undomesticated
corporations have most commonly invoked state judicial processes only to
be denied relief because of the operation of these laws.
A. Contract Actions
An undomesticated foreign corporation which brings suit for amounts
due under a contract with a local domiciliary is apt to be met at the outset
with a motion to dismiss or its local equivalent. 54 Though an obvious
injustice will result from defendant's retention of plaintiff's performance
if the motion is granted,5 5 the defendant may prevail on the ground that
48 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN § 10-482 (1956).
49 E.g., N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 218 (contracts made locally before compliance
cannot be enforced by corporation or any successor in title or any person claiming
under such successors or under either); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-8-3 (1953) (con-
tracts made in, or to be performed in, state before compliance wholly void at suit
of corporation or its assignees); Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 764 (1958) (contracts
made locally before compliance cannot be enforced by corporation, its assignees, or
persons claiming under assignee or corporation; however this does not bar suit by
domestic receiver of such corporation).
50o.g., ALASKA Cotp. LAWS ANN. §36-2A-159 (Supp. 1958); CAL. CoRP. CODE
§6801; FLA. STAT. ANN. §613.04 (1956); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1703.29(A)
(1953).
51E.g., HAWAII RaV. LAws § 174-10 (1955) ("shall not be entitled to sue, plead
or appear . . . for any cause of action whatever" during noncompliance).
52E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §33-412(b) (Supp. 1959); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 32, § 157.125 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
53E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §613.04 (1956); S.D. CODE § 11.2103 (1939); see
note 68 infra.
54 Almost without exception the violation of the domestication laws must be
raised by the defendant. E.g., Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Elias Morris & Sons
Co., 43 Ariz. 88, 29 P.2d 137 (1934). Even a certificate from the secretary of state
averring noncompliance has been held unacceptable to raise the issue, the court re-
fusing to take judicial notice of the fact of noncompliance. Pekin Cooperage Co. v.
State ex rel. Pike County, 197 Ark. 341, 122 S.W.2d 468 (1938).
55 Note that this is not a judgment on the merits and has no res judicata effect.
In Admiral Corp. v. Trio Television Sales & Serv., 138 Colo. 157, 330 P.2d 1106
(1958), a suit which had been abated for noncompliance was held not to bar a sub-
sequent suit. The dissent argued that it should be res judicata because dismissal
came after the evidence was in and after the merits had been considered. However,
the majority position seems correct inasmuch as the court grounded its dismissal
specifically on noncompliance.
Some state courts have thought that dismissal was too harsh and have applied
an equitable estoppel against a defendant retaining the contract benefits. See cases
collected in 17 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8519, at 728 n.34 (rev. vol. 1960).
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plaintiff, having chosen to do business in violation of local law, is not en-
titled to use local courts for the resolution of difficulties arising from this
unlawful conduct. This rationale raises several interesting problems. Does
it matter where the contract was made or performed, or where payment was
to be made? Will the courts of other states allow this corporation to obtain
relief if defendant can properly be served therein? Finally, how much
freedom for judicial interpretation is provided by the words of the par-
ticular statute being applied?
Some older statutes declared contracts or acts by undomesticated cor-
porations "void," 16 but the difficulties and uncertainties attending this
classification have led most legislatures to prescribe the consequences of
noncompliance in more detail; today only Arizona has an all-acts-void
statute.57 Such a provision is apt to leave foreign corporations totally
without remedy with respect to its intrastate commercial transactions.5 8
Probably the strongest impetus for the abandonment of this terminology
was the fluid meaning of the word "void." The term's strict application
could conceivably boomerang to the serious detriment of those whom the
statute was intended to protect.59 Even if this does not occur, the pro-
tection of local interests hardly seems to require the total nullification of
The argument for refusing to apply estoppel, based on the policy of prohibitory statutes,
is presented in id. at 732. After an extensive review of the authorities, the Delaware
high court refused to allow a defendant to retain benefits where plaintiff's omission
consisted of a failure to appoint a statutory agent. Model Heating Co. v. Magarity,
25 Del. 459, 81 Atl. 394 (1911). "[A] different construction would open an avenue
of easy escape to the dishonest debtor, and produce in many cases a harsh result,
especially where the default might be due to oversight and neglect, rather than inten-
tional wrong." Protective Fin. Corp. v. Glass, 100 NJ.L. 85, 87, 125 AtI. 879, 880
(Sup. Ct. 1924).
56 See 17 FLETcHER, PRIvATE CoPoRAvioNs § 8509 (rev. vol. 1960); Note, The
Enforcibility of Contracts of Unlicensed Foreign Corporations, 25 COLUm. L. Rxv.
806, 807 (1925). The term "void" was occasionally read into statutes which did
not speak to this question directly. E.g., Pittsburgh Constr. Co. v. West Side Belt
R.R., 154 Fed. 929 (3d Cir. 1907).
5 7 Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-482 (1956).
58The corporation's dilemma may be given an extra edge where the local courts
read into the provision a manifestation of the state's "public policy." See National
Union Indem. Co. v. Bruce Bros., 44 Ariz. 454, 38 P.2d 648 (1934). The phrase is
so vague that it can justify almost anything. For example, continued enforcement
of a disability after a statutory amendment which left the sanction unexpressed was
explained in terms of public policy, the court refusing to find a repeal by implication
from an increase in the penalty. Hicks Body Co. v. Ward Body Works, Inc., 233
F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1956).
However, under such a statute, a foreign corporation need not fear that its con-
tracts will be open to attack by all third parties who may be affected by them. See
St. Avit v. Kettle River Co., 216 Fed. 872 (8th Cir. 1914) ; Hayden v. Dallas County,
143 S.W.2d 990 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
59 To say that the legislature intended the statute to render void contracts
made without complying with it is to say that the legislature intended that if
a foreign company should write life insurance in this state it might take the
premiums, and then, upon the death of the person insured, refuse to pay the
policies; and it is to say that a farmer of this state may purchase a machine
or a herd of cattle from a nonresident corporation on credit, secure the price
by chattel mortgage, refuse to pay, and then defeat an action of replevin for
the property. Such an interpretation might attract the enthusiastic admiration
of the highwayman, but it has nothing to commend itself to a court of justice.
State v. American Book Co., 69 Kan. 1, 17, 76 Pac. 411, 416, appeal dismissed, 193
U.S. 49 (1904).
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agreements consciously undertaken. If the concept of nullification were
taken seriously, an otherwise innocent foreign corporation could as well be
swindled by an angling domiciliary as vice-versa, voidness being mutual.
Finally, such a provision allows excessive judicial discretion, as nothing
inherent in the term makes certain the consequences which will follow from
its application. 60 Even changes in phraseology have not always been suc-
cessful in eliminating the disquieting features. In Missouri, where the
courts had for years interpreted the legislative pronouncement to mean
that precompliance contracts were incurably void,01 a new statute was
passed barring suits "while the requirements . . . [are] not complied
with." 62 The first decision under this amendment failed to find in it any
intent to change the status of contracts. The court concluded that if the
legislature had sought to validate contracts it would have added a separate
provision to that effect, as had the Illinois legislature, whose enactment
supposedly had been this statute's model. 3 Precompliance contracts were
still void in Missouri. Not until twelve years and some criticism 64 later
was this result cast in doubt by a Missouri lower court decision which
demonstrated what should have been a discernible proposition all along-
that the legislature meant to change the law by changing the words.6 5
Where a statute imposes fines for noncompliance and there is no
express provision concerning the maintenance of contract actions, the courts
have often held the penal amount to be exclusive and have refused to impose
additional disabilities.6 6 But where the legislature has decreed contracts
unenforceable and an undomesticated corporation sues to enforce per-
formance, no rule of interpretation and no undesirable incidental effects
deter the courts' rigorous application of the statute.67 Nor will the plaintiff
usually be able to avoid the disability by assigning its claim to a party other-
wise capable of bringing suit.68 Thus, in these cases, the corporation-or
60 See Note, 25 CoLum. L. REv. 806, 806-11 (1925).
61 See, e.g., United Shoe Mach. Co. v. Ramlose 210 Mo. 631, 109 S.W. 567
(1908).
62 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.635 (1952). This statute was designed to emulate that
of Illinois, which, however, contained a supplemental provision validating contracts.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.125 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
63 -unter Packing Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 98 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Ill.
1948) (applying Missouri law).
64 See, e.g., Jerrold-Stephens Co. v. Gustaveson, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 11 (W.D.
Mo. 1956) (dictum).
65 Salitan v. Carter, Ealey & Dinwiddie, 332 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
66 E.g., Big Four Mills, Ltd. v. Commercial Credit Co., 307 Ky. 612, 211 S.W.2d
831 (1948); G. Ober & Sons v. Katzenstein, 160 N.C. 439, 76 S.E. 476 (1912);
Toledo Tie & Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 33 W. Va. 566, 11 S.E. 37 (1890). Many
courts have reached the opposite conclusion. See 17 FLE.TCHER, PRIvATE CoR0oRATIoNs
§ 8506, at 682 (rev. vol. 1960).
67 The burden of the injustice is no longer a matter for the courts. Van Schuyver
Co. v. Breedman, 225 Fed. 1023 (9th Cir. 1915); Plibrico Jointless Firebrick
Co. v. Waltham Bleachery & Dye Works, 274 Mass. 281, 174 N.E. 487 (1931). It is
sometimes said that the contract is unimpaired but the remedy is withheld. Weber v.
Pend D'Oreille Mining & Reduction Co., 35 Idaho 1, 203 Pac. 891 (1921). This
formulation does not indicate what would happen in a local suit for restitution or
in a suit on the contract in another jurisdiction, assuming defendant could be served.
68 The assignee will be treated in the same manner as the corporate assignor.
Thus, if the defense of noncompliance would bar a suit by the corporation, the
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whoever asserts its claim-will be out of court unless the technical non-
compliance was so insignificant that the corporation may be considered to
have complied "substantially." 6 9
Notwithstanding statutes making contracts "void" or "unenforceable,"
a corporate plaintiff often can withstand a motion to dismiss by averring
that the transaction or contract was out-of-state 70 or that the suit is not
assignee's suit will be dismissed. Seattle Merchants' Ass'n v. Larson, 6 Alaska 264
(D.C. 1920) ; Republic Power & Serv. Co. v. Gus Blass Co., 165 Ark. 163, 263 S.W. 785
(1924) ; Dean v. Caldwell, 141 Ark. 38, 216 S.W. 31 (1919) ; Viking Equip. Co. v.
Central Hotel Co., 230 Mo. App. 304, 91 S.W.2d 94 (1936). But if the defense is
merely one in abatement, subsequent compliance by the assignor will enable the
assignee to maintain the suit. See Lewis v. Club Realty Co., 264 Mass. 588, 163
N.E. 172 (1928); Kraft v. Hoppe, 152 Minn. 143, 188 N.W. 162 (1922). The
possibility of rehabilitation sometimes obtains even where the assignee itself is an
undomesticated foreign corporation which is doing local business illegally. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 613.04 (1956); IL.. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.125 (Smith-Hurd
1954) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.20 (1947). The failure to use the statute to secure
compliance by both assignor and assignee is probably explicable by the fact that a
potential assignee whose own local standing is uncertain will not ordinarily take
claims of doubtful enforceability.
The relaxation of these rules in the area of negotiable instruments, where there
is a countervailing policy to foster the circulation of commercial paper, is discussed
in 17 FLETcHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8526 (rev. vol. 1960).
The position of assignees, trustees, and receivers of dissolved or insolvent foreign
corporations is unsettled. The predominant view is that the receiver will be barred
from suit if the corporation would have been. Wiestling v. Marthim, 1 Ind. App. 217,
27 N.E. 576 (1891); Frank v. Broadway Tire Exch. Co., 42 R.I. 27, 105 At. 177
(1918); see Lowenmeyer v. National Lumber Co., 71 Ind. App. 458, 125 N.E. 67
(1919) (dictum). Contra, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 764 (1958) (as to domestic re-
ceivers), Underhill v. Rutland R.R., 90 Vt. 462, 98 Ati. 1017 (1916). The same
result has obtained where the plaintiff was trustee in bankruptcy of a foreign cor-
poration. Fleming v. J. G. McCrory Co., 114 W. Va. 439, 174 S.E. 325 (1933). Contra,
Okin v. A. D. Gosman, Inc. (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 1961), in 84 NJ.L.J. 570 (1961).
These cases suggest that it makes no difference that the corporation might have cured
the defect but for dissolution, if in fact it had not done so before the receiver or trustee
took over. Contra, Rubin v. Kapell, 105 So. 2d 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)
(dictum). For a recent relaxation of this dogma, where there was evidently no attempt
being made to evade the statute by assignment, see Technical Tape Corp. v. Slusher,
358 P.2d 304 (Wash. 1961), in which the assignee was the parent corporation of a
recently dissolved, undomesticated subsidiary; the assignee qualified during the course
of the litigation. See also ALAsKA Com-P. LAWS ANN. tit. 36, § 36-2A-159 (Supp.
1958), which allows suit by the assignee when a corporation "has acquired all or sub-
stantially all of [assignor's] assets.' As to the "curability" of defects generally, see
pp. 266-69 infra.69 "Substantial" compliance has been found for these purposes where a previously
domesticated corporation failed to repeat the necessary acts of compliance under a
new domestication statute and suit was brought on a transaction antedating the
new statute, Industrial Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Meyers-Abel Co., 12 Ariz. 48, 95
Pac. 115 (1908), where the corporation sued under a name which was slightly dif-
ferent from that under which it was domesticated, Indian Ref. Co. v. Royal Oil Co.,
102 Cal. App. 710, 283 Pac. 856 (Dist. Ct. App. 1929), and where the plaintiff corpora-
tion had complied with all domestication requirements save that it maintain a local
stock transfer office, Claude Neon Fed. Co. v. Four Hundred Club, 16 La. App. 651,
134 So. 445 (1931) (alternative holding). But cf. Tarr v. Western Loan & Say.
Co., 15 Idaho 741, 99 Pac. 1049 (1909) (no substantial compliance where charter
not filed with county recorder). Decisions such as these should not prevent the
state from subsequently requiring full compliance, recovering penalties, or barring
further local activity, for the substantiality of compliance may properly depend on
the purpose for which noncompliance is invoked.
70 The distinction pointed out earlier between statutes which close the courts'
doors for any purpose and those which do so only for controversies arising from
intrastate transactions, see text accompanying notes 50-51 mipra, is important in these
situations.
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one on or under the contract. The latter plea has little application beyond
the fictional intricacies of quasi-contract, 71 but the former involves subtle
principles of conflict of laws. The court must decide the case in such a
way as not to give domestication statutes extraterritorial effect.72 Of
course, a contract may have several significant stages which can be split
among two or more states, such as the places of negotiation, execution,
performance, passing of title, and payment. Where less than all of the
operative acts have been done or are agreed to be done in the forum state,
the conflicts problem can be immense; but in practice the courts have not
been greatly concerned with the complexities. More often than not their
first step has been to apply the conflicts rule that the law governing shall
be that of the place of the "making" of the contract,73 the "making" in turn
to depend upon where the last act to give the contract binding effect was
performed.74 If that act occurred outside the forum state, the domestica-
tion law of the forum does not govern the transaction. In no case has
there been inquiry into the "whole" law-including the law of the conflict
of laws-of the place where the contract was "made," not even in cases in
which the last act of contracting was the only contact with that place and
the court might properly suspect that the making of the contract was care-
fully contrived so as to evade the local domestication statute.
75
71 See Evyan Perfumes, Inc. v. Hamilton, 20 Misc. 2d 950, 195 N.Y.S.2d 869
(Sup. Ct. 1959) (assumpsit on common count, raising implied contract, not a "contract"
action); cf. Knight Prods., Inc. v. Donnen-Fuel Co., 20 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1940)
(action for an accounting is a suit on a "contract").
72 E.g., Allen v. Alleghany Co., 196 U.S. 458 (1905); Hyde v. Goodnow, 3
N.Y. 266 (1850); New England Road Mach. Co. v. Calkins, 121 Vt. 118, 149 A.2d
734 (1959). A different result can obtain if the contract was "void" in the place of
making, in which case no court is apt to enforce it
73 This is the usual conflicts of law rule governing contracts, and there can be
no objection to the forum making this initial characterization according to its own
law. Other possible choices are the law of the state where the "essential" contacts
are grouped and the law of the state where performance is contemplated. While
reason might commend either of these alternatives in some situations, courts have
seldom done so. See text accompanying note 83 infra. See generally GOODRICH,
CONFLICT OF LAws § 110 (3d ed. 1949).
74 See GooDRICH, op. cit. supra note 73, § 107. This choice of law is made on the
basis of the internal law of the forum state. The last act is usually the offeree's
signature. See Transradio Press Serv., Inc. v. Whitmore, 47 N.M. 95, 137 P.2d
309 (1943); Alexander Film Co. v. Pierce, 46 N.M. 110, 121 P.2d 940 (1942);
Thorner v. Selective Cam Transmission Co., 4 Cal. Rptr. 409 (Ct. App. 1960).
But see Republic Acceptance Corp. v. Bennett, 220 Mich. 249, 257, 189 N.W. 901, 904
(1922), where the controlling last act was the delivery of plaintiff's check in payment
for the goods bought. In the absence of a showing as to where the contract was
made, a motion to dismiss has been denied because the court generously considered it-
self bound to presume "that the contract was not made within this state and that the
corporation is not doing business here." National Merchandising Corp. v. Powers,
8 Misc. 2d 881, 168 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
75 In Alexander Film Co. v. Pierce, 46 N.M. 110, 121 P.2d 940 (1942), the foreign
corporation would not be bound on any contract until it had been signed at the
home office. Every other significant contact took place in the state where it failed
to domesticate-solicitation, negotiation, performance. Application of the last-act-to-
make-it-binding test absolved plaintiff of the local statutory infirmity. See Hayes,
Iowa Corporations & Partnerships: 1942-1952, 38 IowA L. REv. 462, 489 (1953).
The uniformity with which courts use the "place of making" and the "last act" as
controlling factors may account for the common practice of requiring home office
acceptance of all out-of-state contracts. A small and distinct portion of this problem
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Plaintiff's right to maintain a contract suit may remain unimpaired
if the defendant can be found to have "waived" plaintiff's noncompliance; 76
this possibility obtains primarily in those jurisdictions whose statutes do
not bar plaintiff's suit but merely withhold a remedy until compliance is
completed. In such a case, it is reasoned that since defendant never had
a defense on the merits and could only abate the suit until plaintiff complied,
the court may overlook the technicality of requiring compliance if the
defense has not been raised at an early stage. This result appears equitable
as between the parties-it may make sense to penalize the defendant for
neglect where the court's resources have been taxed by a trial-but it
entirely overlooks the state's interest. By denying defendant the right to
stave off final judgment at least until plaintiff complies, the court permits
the corporate offender to obtain its judgment without complying-in direct
contravention of the statute. The state may find this particularly objection-
able if it becomes the feeling of defendants generally that it is not to their
advantage to plead a merely dilatory defense 77 and foreign corporations
cease to consider the disability a spur to compliance.
B. Protection of Property and Related Rights
Notwithstanding statutes barring the maintenance of an action for
failure to domesticate, there are procedures-of varying degrees of efficacy
-by which a foreign corporation can use local courts to protect its property
within the state.
Among the methods for protection of personalty which have met with
some success are replevin 7s-sometimes even though the wrongful reten-
tion of the property arose from a contract which in that state would be
wholly void 79, trover,80 and conversion. 8 ' The rationale usually ex-
pressed is a distinction between contract and tort.
is dealt with by statutes declaring undomesticated corporations ineligible to enter
into any contract for certain state construction which is required to be let by sealed
bid. E.g., Neb. Laws 1959, ch. 77, § 1, at 316.
76 Reed & Co. v. Harshall, 12 Cal. App. 697, 108 Pac. 719 (Dist. Ct App. 1910);
Gallafent v. Tucker, 48 Idaho 240, 281 Pac. 375 (1929) ; Outdoor Elec. Advertising,
Inc. v. Saurage, 207 La. 344, 21 So. 2d 375 (1945) ; cf. Peter & Burghard Stone Co.
v. Carper, 96 Ind. App. 554, 172 N.E. 319 (1930). Where contracts made before
compliance are "void," no waiver is possible. National Union Indem. Co. v. Bruce
Bros., 44 Ariz. 454, 38 P.2d 648 (1934).
77 See notes 162-63 infra and accompanying text.
78 See Rex Beach Pictures Co. v. Harry I. Garson Prods., 209 Mich. 692, 177
N.W. 254 (1920); United Shoe Mach. Co. v. Ramlose, 231 Mo. 508, 132 S.W. 1133
(1910). But see Case v. Mills Novelty Co., 187 Miss. 673, 193 So. 625 (1940);
cf. Cable Piano Co. v. Estes, 206 Ala. 95, 89 So. 372 (1921) (detinue).
79 United Shoe Mach. Co. v. Ramlose, supra note 78; Mojonnier Bros. v. Detroit
Milling Co., 233 Mich. 312, 206 N.W. 525 (1925) (dictum).
80 Dominion Fertilizer Co. v. White, 115 Me. 1, 96 Atl. 1069 (1916) (construing
"no action" statute to bar only contract action); Farrand Co. v. Walker, 169 Mo.
App. 602, 155 S.W. 68 (1913) (though contract with agent void, corporation may
bring trover) ; MacLeod v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 24 R.I. 500, 53 Atl. 867 (1902)
(judgment gained in trover suit not itself a "contract" so as to be barred).
s 1 Lu-Mi-Nus Signs Co. v. Regent Theatre Co., 250 Mich. 535, 231 N.W. 128
(1930); National Match Co. v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 227 Mo. App. 1115, 58
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Courts have permitted foreign corporations to protect their real prop-
erty within the state by ejectment and recovery of possession. 82  On the
other hand, suits to foreclose mortgages have not been uniformly successful.
The Supreme Court has allowed a state to deny foreclosure of a mortgage
on local land by an incompletely domesticated corporation, even though all
the contacts of the note obligation which the mortgage secured were made
in another state.8 3 But foreclosure may be successful if the corporation
can show compliance by its predecessor trustee,84 if the state allows subse-
quent compliance to cure disability and such compliance is forthcoming
before final judgment,8 5 or, of course, if the foreign corporation is held not
to have engaged in intrastate business.86
The question of "waiver" of the defense of noncompliance has not
been squarely presented to the courts in mortgage foreclosure cases as it
has in the context of contracts. However, the fact of noncompliance has
been raised and rejected in two cases. One arose on a petition to vacate a
prior judgment; 8 7 the other was a suit to quiet title against an execu-
tion sale purchaser. s 8 In both there was a failure to plead noncompliance
at the time of foreclosure, an active defense on other grounds, and a final
judgment decreeing foreclosure on behalf of the foreign corporation. These
cases are obviously much stronger for penalizing the defendant's delay,
even considering the state's interest in securing compliance, than such as
did so in the contract areas, for here the postjudgment assertion of non-
compliance is a collateral attack on that judgment which may affect the
rights of third parties and disrupt orderly judicial procedure. The
denial of the bar of noncompliance because of a prolonged delay also sub-
serves the state's policy, at least where precompliance contracts are void,
by urging the defendant to diligence in unearthing plaintiff's unauthorized
conduct. However, this consideration is not peculiar to foreclosure cases.
S.W.2d 797, cert. denied, 290 U.S. 668 (1933). Where plaintiff pleads a cause of
action on a contract and one for conversion, in the alternative, summary dismissal
has been denied. Arkansas Airmotive Div. of Currey Aerial Sprayers, Inc. v.
Arkansas Aviation Sales, Inc., 335 S.W.2d 813 (Ark. 1960).
82 Sayers & Muir Serv. Station v. Indian Ref. Co., 266 Ky. 779, 100 S.W.2d
687 (1936); Darling Shops Delaware Corp. v. Gelmart, Inc., 72 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Sup.
Ct. 1947). Analogously, it has been held that a foreign corporation can sue for
possession of severed realty, D. M. Ferry & Co. v. Smith, 36 Idaho 67, 209 Pac.
1066 (1922), and to protect realty against trespass, Indian River Mfg. Co. v. Wooten,
55 Fla. 745, 46 So. 185 (1908).
83 Chattanooga Nat'1 Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Denson, 189 U.S. 408 (1903).
84 American Nafl Bank & Trust Co. v. Edith Rockefeller McCormick Trust
223 Wis. 590, 270 N.W. 345 (1937).
85 Burton v. Oliver Farm Equip. Sales Co., 121 Fla. 148, 163 So. 468 (1935)
(domestication during trial); Hogue v. D. N. Morrison Constr. Co., 115 Fla. 293,
156 So. 377 (1937). Contra, Tarr v. Western Loan & Say. Co., 15 Idaho 741, 99
Pac. 1049 (1909). Foreclosure by advertisement has been allowed to proceed in the
face of a statute prohibiting the maintenance of an "action." Flakne v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 198 Minn. 465, 270 N.W. 566 (1936).
86E.g., Martin v. Bankers' Trust Co., 18 Ariz. 55, 156 Pac. 87 (1916) (fore-
closure) ; see Family Budget Plan, Inc. v. Ede, 5 Bucks 121 (Pa. C.P. 1955).
87 Steele v. The Maccabees, 175 Okla. 471, 53 P.2d 232 (1936).
S8 Apache Land & Cattle Co. v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 145 F.2d 964 (9th Cir.
1944) (applying Arizona law which declared acts void).
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Analogous to the protection-of-property suits are those in which a
foreign corporation seeks to enjoin the use or registration of a deceptively
similar corporate name or seeks to invoke a local fair trade law in order
to enforce a resale price maintenance policy. It is to be observed, however,
that no effort has been made by the courts to analogize to "protection of
property" when confronted with these situations8s9 Although it has been
held that a foreign corporation which has done no local business-and thus
is not subject to domestication requirements or to disabilities for failure
to domesticate--cannot enjoin a local corporation from using a deceptively
similar name, since it would be inimical to the public policy of the state to
allow an attack on a corporate name approved by the state,9 the New York
courts have allowed an injunction both when the foreign corporation was
not doing intrastate business 91 and when it was 2 -the latter despite the
fact that plaintiff's case would require affirmative proof of its unauthorized
intrastate conduct. It would seem to be clearly to the state's advantage for
a court to allow such actions by foreign corporations; local citizens will
benefit, for when a corporate name is "deceptively similar," it is they who
may be duped and injured. Therefore, the states should be hospitable to
these suits, notwithstanding their interest in regulating foreign corporations.
89 It is arguable that a corporation should be able to protect the "property"
which it has in its name or its goodwill as readily as its physical possessions, no mat-
ter how those interests are labeled for other purposes. Considering the purposes
for which domestication statutes are enacted, a failure "to strictly comply with the
statutes . . . does not so shock the conscience of the chancellor as to make it a
prey to all evilly disposed persons." Northwest Ready Roofing Co. v. Antes, 117
Neb. 121, 124, 219 N.W. 848, 850 (1928). The Fifth Circuit came close to a pro-
tection-of-plaintiff's-property analysis when it allowed suit for an injunction in Scalise
v. National Util. Serv., Inc., 120 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1941). In that case, plaintiff,
an unregistered foreign corporation, filed suit to enjoin defendant from using its name.
When it was discovered that plaintiff was not registered, the action was abated for
the specific purpose of allowing it to register. Defendant, however, which was also
unregistered, succeeded in domesticating before plaintiff had an opportunity to do so,
hoping thereby to foreclose its action. The court nevertheless enjoined defendant's
use of plaintiff's name.
90 Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton Tripod Boiler Co., 142 Ill. 494, 30 N.E. 339
(1892). Cf. Investors Syndicate of America, Inc. v. Hughes, 378 Ill. 413, 38 N.E.2d
754 (1942). In General Indus. Co. v. 20 Wacker Drive Bldg. Corp., 156 F.2d 474
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 792 (1946), an injunction was granted. The
distinction was taken between what the plaintiff could do in state and federal courts
to protect its name. Some of the cases relied upon were pre-Erie. If Illinois law
governed the plaintiff's rights, as the court indicated, it is hard to see how the federal
court could avoid the "public policy" expressed in the Illinois decisions. See note 17
supra and accompanying text.
91 National Tool Salvage Co. v. National Tool Salvage Indus., Inc., 186 Misc.
833, 60 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
92 Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. v. Dunlin Donuts, Inc., 176 N.Y.S.2d 915
(Sup. Ct. 1958), af'd, 8 App. Div. 2d 228, 188 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1959). The statute
invoked was one barring suits on locally made contracts, and the court found that
there was no contractual relationship between the parties. In addition, the court was
reluctant to add disabilities not specifically legislated-a consistent policy of the New
York courts. See Pennsylvania Publications, Inc. v. Senft, 280 App. Div. 918, 116
N.Y.S.2d 5 (1952) (per curiam) (common-law fraud suit not barred) ; Evyan Per-
fumes, Inc. v. Hamilton, 20 Misc. 2d 950, 195 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (assumpsit
on common count, raising implied contract, not a "contract" action). In Home
Insulation Co. v. Home & Bldg. Insulation Co., 175 Okla. 428, 52 P.2d 1065 (1936), suit
for an injunction against the use of a deceptively similar name was allowed, but no
inquiry was made as to whether the corporation was engaged in intrastate business.
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Several recent decisions have considered whether an undomesticated
foreign corporation can take advantage of a local fair trade statute by en-
joining sales below the fixed price. They clearly acknowledge that mere
resort to local courts for this purpose is not a doing of business sufficient
to subject the corporation to domestication requirements and incapacitate
it from suing before compliance.93 However, if other acts of the corpora-
tion amount to intrastate business, the corporation may be prevented from
invoking the fair trade statute, even though the business which it wants
ultimately to defend is interstate.94 Since the power to enforce a fair trade
policy derives solely from state statutes,95 it is only fair, as the New Jersey
court observed in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On Drugs, Inc., 6 to require a
foreign corporation "which seeks to take advantage of a cause of action
given it by one of our laws, to comply with the provisions of the other
as a condition to taking advantage of the other statute." 
97
Eli Lilly illustrates the unfortunate extent to which small factual
variations may affect the results of cases in this area. In Remington Arms
Co. v. Lechmere Tire & Sales Co.,98 where plaintiff corporation was en-
gaged in only slightly less local activity9 9 than that described in Lilly,'00
the Massachusetts court held that the corporation was engaged solely in
interstate business and could invoke the local fair trade act as a necessary
incident to that business. The decision was clearly based on a construc-
tion of the local domestication statute, not on the judges' interpretation of
the constitutional limits of state regulation of foreign corporations.10 ' The
court conceded that the precedents on which it relied might be a bit old
fashioned in the light of more recent Supreme Court cases under the
commerce clause, but it expressly dismissed those cases as irrelevant to the
interpretation of the state statute.10 2  Nevertheless, the New Jersey court,
93 Remington Arms Co. v. Lechmere Tire & Sales Co., 339 Mass. 131, 158
N.E.2d 134 (1959); Weco Prods. Co. v. G.E.M., Inc., 2 CCH CoRP. L. GumFE
19773 (Minn. Dist. Ct. March 1, 1960); United States Time Corp. v. Grand Union
Co., 64 N.J. Super. 39, 165 A.2d 310 (Ch. 1960).
94 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On Drugs, Inc., 57 N.J. Super. 291, 154 A.2d
650 (Ch. 1959), aff'd, 31 N.J. 591, 158 A.2d 528, aff'd, 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
95 General Elec. Co. v. Packard Bamberger & Co., 14 N.J. 209, 102 A.2d 18
(1953).
9657 N.J. Super. 291, 154 A.2d 650 (Ch. 1959), aff'd, 31 N.J. 591, 158 A.2d 528,
aff'd, 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
97Id. at 304, 154 A.2d at 657.
98339 Mass. 131, 158 N.E.2d 134 (1959).
99 Remington's activity in Massachusetts consisted of maintaining a local office
with a full-time employee and bank account, employing solicitor-salesmen, displaying
sample guns, giving chevrons to gun clubs, employing field agents and shoppers to
detect violations of local fair trade contracts, and suing occasionally to enforce resale
price maintenance. Id. at 133-35, 158 N.E.2d at 136-37.
100 Lilly's activity in New Jersey consisted of maintaining a local office with two
permanent employees and eighteen "detailmen," whose salaries were paid by the home
office and whose function was to visit retail pharmacists, physicians, and hospitals in
order to promote plaintiff's products. The detailmen occasionally accepted retailers'
orders for transmittal to a wholesaler. 57 N.J. Super. at 298-99, 154 A.2d at 654.




when it came to dispose of Remington in order to decide Lilly, rejected the
Massachusetts case on the ground that it might have gone the other way
had counsel argued the obsolescence of the older cases.'
03
The apparent lack of predictability which these two cases suggest is
especially unfortunate in an area where the substantive law may have the
effect of drawing large corporations into local litigation to enforce rights
given to them under local law, only to be confronted by the challenge that
previous local promotional activities add up to local doing of business.
And it is difficult to find possible patterns for the future by looking to the
policy of the fair trade laws themselves. To the extent that they are in-
tended to protect local retailers against loss-leader competition and local
consumers against fraudulent practices which might be introduced to
promote that competition, 10 4 the courts might well be motivated to place as
few obstacles as possible in the way of a national producer trying to enforce
these laws. The motivation might be especially strong if the defendant
who invokes the domestication statute has apparently not been the victim of
any of the specific evils intended to be prevented by the statute. Balancing
this motivation is the rationale expressed by the New Jersey court: insofar
as the fair trade law is designed to confer an economic advantage upon the
plaintiff-by protecting its good will as represented by its brand name' 0 5 -
the state can rightly insist that the corporation be held to rigorous com-
pliance with state laws before it may enforce that advantage.'06
C. Arbitration
New York has faced, virtually alone, the problem of whether an un-
domesticated foreign corporation can use local courts to compel arbitration
under a locally made contract. Its domestication statute provides that no
"action" can be maintained by such corporation 0 7 The first construction
of the statute on this point was to the effect that arbitration would be
barred since the term "action" encompasses all legal remedies which require
invocation of the jurisdiction of the courts.'0 8 But in In the Matter of
Tugee Laces, Inc.'1 9 the New York Court of Appeals accepted the contrary
view, classing arbitration as a "special proceeding" and holding that service
of notice to arbitrate is not the institution of an "action" within the mean-
ing of the domestication statute." This conclusion may have been carried
another step by the decision of a lower New York court allowing con-
103 57 N.J. Super. at 301, 158 A.2d at 656.
104 See Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. CHi. L. REv. 175, 180-84 (1954).
105 See id. at 184-86.
' 0 6 See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
107 N.Y. GEN. CoRp. LAW § 218.
108 In the Matter of Vanguard Films, Inc., 188 Misc. 796, 67 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup.
Ct. 1947).
109 297 N.Y. 914, 79 N.E.2d 744 (1948).
110 This decision controlled an unwilling court in Avalon Fabrics, Inc. v. Raymill
Fabric Corp., 96 N.Y.S.2d 50 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
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firmation and enforcement of an arbitration award involving two un-
domesticated foreign corporations."' Whether this position will be ex-
tended to the enforcement of an award against a domestic defendant is
problematical.11
2
The Tugee Laces decision is contrary to the policy of the disability
provision of the domestication statute, which is to apply sufficient pressure
to an offending corporation to force it to domesticate. If the plaintiff cor-
poration should prevail in the arbitration, it may well have achieved in
effect precisely what it was seeking when it made its local contract arbi-
trable under the local statute, for the defendant may be inclined to abide
by the award and avoid the further expense and trouble of defending a
motion to confirm or prosecuting a motion to vacate. However, assuming
that the court of appeals was correct in allowing the use of court processes
to compel arbitration, it is difficult to see how any further obstacle can
then be placed in the way of the plaintiff's carrying the arbitration all the
way to confirmation and judgment. The quality of arbitration as a "special
proceeding" hardly permits anything but a formalistic distinction to be
made between compelling arbitration and enforcing an award. It would
be a waste of the court's and the parties' time for the court to compel
arbitration if, subsequently, it would be unwilling to enforce an award."1
3
D. Suits Against Unfaithful Agents
Occasionally a foreign corporation will have to resort to the courts of
a state in which it has not domesticated in order to vindicate its rights
against one of its own employees or agents. If the employee has withheld
funds collected on behalf of the corporation, the corporation's ability to
recover them may depend on the familiar issue-whether it has done local
business."14 The disability is said to express "the broad and controlling
rights of the public" which override "the propriety and policy of a rule of
private law." 1-5 Some courts, however, have allowed relief on the ground
"' In the Matter of Terminal Auxiliar Maritima, S.A., 11 Misc. 2d 697, 178
N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. 1957); cf. Temple v. Riverland Co., 228 S.W. 605 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1921) (entry of judgment after statutory arbitration is ministerial, involving
no judicial function, hence not an "action" within prohibition of domestication
statute).
" 2 Although the court employs the "special proceeding" dialectic found in Tugee
Laces, its holding might be able to be sustained under N.Y. GEN. Coai. LAw § 225,
permitting certain actions by undomesticated foreign corporations where the defendant
is also a foreign corporation. The opinion does not state sufficient facts to determine
whether this is true.
"'s Cf. 110 U. PA. L. REv. 113, 118 (1961).
"14 Compare S. Gumpert Co. v. Hernreich, 199 Ark. 376, 134 S.W.2d 568 (1939),
with Thomas Mfg. Co. v. Knapp, 101 Minn. 432, 112 N.W. 989 (1907). See also
Country Club Soda Co. v. Weinberg, 3 Conn. Supp. 237 (C.P. 1935) (employee
enjoined from soliciting plaintiff's customers on behalf of a competitor).
"15 Thomas Mfg. Co. v. Knapp, supra note 114, at 438, 112 N.W. at 992; accord,
". R. Watkins Medical Co. v. Williams, 124 Ark. 539, 187 S.W. 653 (1916); see
Note, 3 TEXAs L. Rav. 183, 188 (1925).
[Vo1.110:241
FAILURE TO DOMESTICATE
either that the employee is "estopped" to deny plaintiff's right to the funds
or that a contrary result would sanction employee dishonesty.116
Efforts to harmonize these polar policies are inhibited by the courts'
retreat behind "estoppel" and "public rights." While it is true that the
state has seen fit to disable the corporation for its misconduct, it is equally
true that the agent should be stripped of illicit gains. The fact that one
state policy is expressed through legislative enactment and the other is
embodied in the common law should have no significance in circumstances
where the purpose of the common-law rule can be well served or seriously.
injured, depending on the outcome of the case, while the purpose under-
lying the statute will not be much affected by either result. If the cor-
poration is not allowed to sue, the statutory policy is arguably served by a
promotion of an indirect deterrent to noncompliance, but the common-law
policy is crippled by removing one of the most effective deterrents to
embezzlement-stripping the embezzler of his ill-gotten gains.11 7 On the
other hand, if the corporation is allowed to sue, the common-law policy
is promoted and, since the defendant is not among the class intended to be
directly protected by the domestication law, the statutory policy is only
slightly disserved. Hence, the corporation should be allowed to sue in this
kind of case." 8
E. Capacity to Defend Lawsuits
A high degree of uniformity obtains regarding the ability of un-
domesticated foreign corporations to defend all varieties of suits.119 The
right to do so is held to apply with equal force to substantive and pro-
116 United States Express Co. v. Lucas, 36 Ind. 361 (1871) ; cf. Hovey's Estate,
198 Pa. 385, 48 Ati. 311 (1901) (recovery of corporate funds from estate of de-
ceased agent).
117 Of course, the defendant is always subject to criminal prosecution, regardless
of the limits on the corporation's right to recover. E.g., Barr v. State, 10 Ala. App.
111, 65 So. 197 (1914).
118 Other types of actions against agents or employees which have been allowed,
evidently without destroying the state's domestication policy, are trover under circum-
stances in which the contract with the agent-defendant was void due to the corpora-
tion's failure to comply, Farrand Co. v. Walker, 169 Mo. App. 602, 155 S.W. 68
(1913), and a suit for an injunction against the disclosure of trade secrets, Jerrold-
Stephens Co. v. Gustaveson, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 11 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
119 See, e.g., Haberman v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 224 F.2d 401, modified,
225 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 948 (1956) (rescission) ; Frantz v.
McBee Co., 77 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1955) (tort) ; Brecht v. Bur-Ne Co., 91 Fla. 345,
108 So. 173 (1926) (protection of property) ; Rowley v. Bird Island Trapping Co.,
202 La. 273, 11 So. 2d 553 (1942) (assignment); Gill v. S.H.B. Corp., 322 Mich.
700, 34 N.W.2d 526 (1948) (contract); Newcomb v. Blakenship, 256 S.W.2d 700
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953); John C. Cutler Ass'n v. Dejay Stores, 3 Utah 2d 107, 279
P.2d 700 (1955). Oddly enough, in a state whose statute says nothing about the
right to defend in the event of failure to appoint a local agent for service of process
and does not require a foreign corporation to appoint such an agent until its articles
are filed, such a corporation has been allowed to defend while in total violation of the.
law but not if it has taken the first and not the second step of compliance. See
Winston v. Idaho Hardwood Co., 23 Cal. App. 211, 137 Pac. 601 (Dist. Ct. App.
1913).
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cedural' 20 defenses. In many jurisdictions the right to defend is now
specifically preserved by statute; 121 in a few, however, noncompliance
statutorily precludes a foreign corporation from the benefits of local laws,
especially the statute of limitations.1 22
Counterclaim may be one important part of a defendant's position and
a foreign corporation will ordinarily be permitted to assert a counter-
claim, 2 3 although compliance at that time may be necessary. 2 4 Under-
standably, this right will usually be denied where the counterclaim is based
on an intrastate transaction the vindication of which would otherwise be
barred by the relevant statute. 25 The right may, of course, be statutorily
withheld,' 6 but in a case where this was not done, even a discontinuance
of plaintiff's suit was held not to convert defendant corporation into a
"plaintiff" so as to require discontinuance of the counterclaim as well. 2 7
There appears to be no undue hardship on plaintiffs in allowing, within
limits, the presentation of counterclaims, whereas their prohibition might
permit claims to be presented with less than full disclosure of the probative




120 Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956)
(statute of limitations); Taylor v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, 95 F.2d 907 (9th
Cir. 1938) (same). A change of venue can always be requested by a foreign cor-
poration. Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Herrmann, 211 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948). Whether it will be granted will generally depend upon where defendant cor-
poration carries on its intrastate business. Kentucky Straight Creek Coal Co. v. Com-
monwealth, 304 Ky. 247, 200 S.W.2d 470 (1947). But the privilege of change can
be readily lost by defective pleading, Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Herrmann, supra;
defective compliance, Noland Co. v. Laxton Constr. Co., 244 N.C. 50, 92 S.E.2d 398
(1956) ; or defective partial compliance, Kane v. Universal Film Exchs., Inc., 32 Cal.
App. 2d 365, 89 P.2d 693 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (no county place of business
established).
121 See statutes cited note 52 supra.
122 HAWAII REv. LAWS § 174-10 (1955) (benefits of Hawaiian law denied, particu-
larly the statute of limitations) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-509 (1948) (statute of limi-
tations denied for failure to comply); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 93 (1957) (statute
of limitations denied); NEv. REv. STAT. § 80.220 (1957) (statute of limitations sus-
pended during noncompliance); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-8-3 (1953) (benefit of laws
relating to corporations denied) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.847 (1957) (capacity to de-
fend denied until compliance); see Black v. Vermont Marble Co., 1 Cal. App. 718,
82 Pac. 1060 (Dist. Ct. App. 1905).
123 Intra-Mar Shipping (Cuba) S.A. v. John S. Emery & Co., 11 F.R.D. 284
(S.D.N.Y. 1951). In Smith v. Kincade, 232 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1956), the assertion
of the counterclaim under FED. R. Civ. P. 13, was permitted despite a state prohibi-
tion against bringing or maintaining actions.
124 M. S. Cohn Gravel Co. v. Terry, 135 Okla. 275, 275 Pac. 1048 (1928).
125 Roberts v. Cat-Nak Mfg. Co., 216 Ill. App. 245 (1919) (set-off relating to
intrastate business); Rib Falls Lumber Co. v. Lesh & Mathews Lumber Co., 144
Wis. 362, 129 N.W. 595 (1911) (counterclaim arising from wholly void contract).
But see Smith v. Kincade, 232 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1956).
126 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-8-3 (1953).
127 Bellak v. Bon Specialty Co., 80 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
128 A minor but analogous area concerns the assertion of cross-claims. The few
cases discussing this problem provide no basis for the formulation of a rule. See Tarr
v. Western Loan & Say. Co., 15 Idaho 741, 99 Pac. 1049 (1909) (permitted); High-
tower Petroleum Corp. v. Story, 236 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (refused).
In Flakne v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 198 Minn. 465, 471, 270 N.W. 566, 569 (1936),
the court stated that "by bringing [defendant] . . . into court, the appellants are
estopped from claiming that defendant has no right to be in court."
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Foreign corporations have not been hindered in their use of substan-
tive defenses.' 29  But neither they, nor those in privity with them,1 30 have
been permitted to raise their own noncompliance as a defense.'31 A foreign
corporation has even been denied the right to defend with its noncompliance
a suit brought by its president, although, in his official capacity, he may
have been solely responsible for the fact that it had not been domesticated.
132
IV. PERSONAL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS
AND SHAREHOLDERS
A final technique for securing compliance with domestication laws
is to subject officers, agents, or shareholders to criminal penalties or per-
sonal civil liability for local corporate acts.133 There is little case law
embellishing the statutes that employ criminal sanctions; apparently they
have seldom been invoked to secure compliance. Personal civil liability
has been somewhat more frequently resorted to-at least it was during
the early part of this century.
Short of attempts to extend legislative jurisdiction to encompass non-
domiciliaries who did not consent to the entry of the corporation of which
they were shareholders into the forum state,13 4 few difficulties were en-
129E.g., permitting evidence of full performance, see Haberman v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc'y, 224 F.2d 401, modified, 225 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 948 (1956) ; Sandia Dev. Corp. v. Allen, 86 Ariz. 40, 340 P.2d 193 (1959) ;
Carolin Mfg. Corp. v. George S. May, Inc., 312 Mich. 487, 20 N.W.2d 283 (1945);
McMillan v. Pawnee Petroleum Corp., 151 Okla. 4, 1 P.2d 775 (1931).
13 0 Kuennan v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 159 Mich. 122, 123 N.W. 799
(1909).
'31 Davis v. Asano Bussan Co., 212 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Cutting v. Bryan,
30 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 860 (1929) ; Union Bank Note Co. v.
Ajax Portland Cement Co., 155 Mo. App. 349, 137 S.W. 18 (1911). Nor can non-
compliance be asserted to avoid validity of service of process. Wentling v. Popular
Science Publishing Co., 176 F. Supp. 652 (M.D. Pa. 1959) ; Showen v. J. L. Owens
Co., 159 Mich. 321, 122 N.W. 640 (1909); cf. Taylor v. Aldridge, 180 Miss. 635,
178 So. 331 (1938) ; Vogue Mfg. Co. v. Cadillac Hosiery Co., 83 Pa. D. & C. 337
(C.P. 1952). The disability appears in statutory form in ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21(89)
(Supp. 1959).
132 Tucker v. Cave Springs Mining Corp., 139 Cal. App. 213, 33 P.2d 871 (Dist.
Ct App. 1934). The defendant corporation did defend on the merits at trial, but
it urged, on appeal, that its noncompliance, for which plaintiff was allegedly respon-
sible, deprived it of the necessity to defend against adverse litigation.
'33 Criminal penalties: Daf.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 349 (1953) (agent); ALA. CODE
tit. 10, § 21(94) (Supp. 1959) (servant); Onio REv. CODE ANN. § 1703.30 (Page
1954) (officer); IOwA CODE ANN. § 494.13 (1949) (employee); CAL. CoRP. CODE
§ 6803 (any person). Severity of penalty: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.205(c) (1951)
($25-$500 fine) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-1014 (1958) (up to 30 days in jail) ;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 613.11 (1956) (up to 6 mos. imprisonment); ALA. CODE tit. 10,
§ 21(94) (Supp. 1959) (up to 12 mos. imprisonment at hard labor); MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. § 15-1706 (1955) (offense classed as misdemeanor, penalties provided
by general penalties section of criminal code).
Civil liability: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-508 (1948) (officers, agents, represen-
tatives) ; MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 181, § 5 (1955) (officers, agents); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 16-8-3 (1953) (agent); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-34 (1957) (officers, agents,
and shareholders).
'34 See Towle v. Beistle, 97 Ind. App. 241, 186 N.E. 344 (1933), 9 IND. L.J. 316
(1934).
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countered by parties attempting to hold officers or associates personally
liable for corporate obligations under local statutes expressly providing
that remedy.135 And, even in the absence of such a statute, liability was
successfully predicated on several common-law theories, the most common
of which were that the persons transacting local business were liable as
agents for a nonexistent corporate principal (none such having been au-
thorized to do business in the forum state) 16 and that the attempt to do
business without qualification was equivalent to coming into the state as a
partnership, without corporate immunity. 37  In theory the "agency" ap-
proach seems narrower than the "partnership" approach, for the latter
apparently permits even those who did not actually conduct the corporate
affairs-including inactive associates 13s-to be reached. Practice, how-
ever, did not go as far as the possibilities of theory suggest. Under the
auspices of "exceptions," nonliability for corporate obligations was accorded
to nonresident, inactive members of the corporation, through rejection of the
partnership theory,139 and to active members, through rejection of the
agency theory.140 In some cases the courts interpreted other statutory pro-
visions, such as those declaring contracts valid, as declaratory of a policy
that corporate obligations were exactly that-corporate; in others the
absence of provisions voiding contracts was said to demonstrate the exclu-
siveness of the specific penalties provided. 141 Many of these complexities
and circumventions might possibly have been avoided if the courts had
found a rationale sui generis to foreign, noncompliant corporations, instead
of borrowing from doctrines of agency and partnership law. But they
did not, and thereby they failed to provide adequate basis for prediction.
142
135 See, e.g., Keeler v. Union Trust Co., 84 Colo. 353, 270 Pac. 867 (1928)
(recovery allowed against incorporator-officer-agents under statute requiring per-
sonal liability on contracts made for noncomplying foreign corporations). But cf.
Herbert H. Pape, Inc. v. Finch, 102 Fla. 425, 136 So. 496, aff'd on rehearing, 102
Fla. 432, 136 So. 500 (1931), where recovery was barred against officer-shareholders
for default on a foreign corporation's note given for the sale of land, the court dis-
tinguishing the mere purchase of property from other forms of doing business which
might have imposed liabiilty.
136E.g., Joseph T. Ryerson & Son v. Shaw, 277 Ill. 524, 115 N.E. 650 (1917)
(officers); McGuire v. Outdoor Life Publishing Co., 311 Ill. App. 267, 35 N.E.2d
817 (1941) (officers). Acceptance of this concept was voiced by Ladd, Liability
of Individuals Conducting the Affairs of a Foreign Corporation Not Authorized To
Do Business in Iowa, 15 IowA L. REv. 285, 297-98, 304-06 (1930).
137 E.g., Taylor v. A. G. Branham & Co., 35 Fla. 297, 17 So. 552 (1895) (share-
holders) ; Equitable Trust Co. v. Central Trust Co., 145 Tenn. 148, 239 S.W. 171
(1921) (shareholders).
138 Ladd, supra note 136, at 301, argued against such an extension.
139 Towle v. Beistle, 97 Ind. App. 241, 186 N.E 344 (1933) (shareholders);
Shawmut Commercial Paper Co. v. Auerbach, 214 Mass. 363, 101 N.E. 1000 (1913)
(officers).
140 American Soap Co. v. Bogue, 114 Ohio St. 149, 150 N.E. 743 (1926) (presi-
dent-manager-director). The case required a new solution, for application of the
"nonexistent principal" theory would have circumvented an otherwise valid bankruptcy.
'4' Note, 41 YALE L.J. 309 (1931). Minor defects in compliance have not sub-
jected even active officials to personal liability where other sanctions were provided.
See Walsh v. Hallstead, 140 Pa. Super. 13, 13 A.2d 95 (1940) (failure to register
change of name).
142 A criticism of judicial reliance on formal labels is found in Note, 19 CORN.
LQ. 90, 94-95 (1933). Acknowledging the inadequacies of personal liability, one
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Recently, the number of suits to impose liability on associates with
regard to corporate obligations has diminished considerably. Statutes in
some states still make certain individuals financially responsible,1 43 but
only two post-1940 suits involving such responsibility for the transactions
of undomesticated corporations have been found.144
The lack of recent reported decisions on this question might be ex-
plained by several factors. The broadening of the "doing business" concept
has enabled local citizens and creditors more readily to secure local serv-
ice of process on and, assuming solvency, pecuniary relief from the cor-
poration itself. Statutes are more explicit in describing the circumstances
in which recovery may be had, and against whom, thereby limiting the
incidence of recourse to higher state tribunals. Resort to bankruptcy has
become more common for distressed associations; local creditors with more
opportunities to press their claims at such proceedings are not forced to
initiate their own suits. Finally, there is a trend toward restricting the
liability of corporate officials in other areas of litigation which could con-
ceivably influence creditors' conduct in this matter.145 Despite these
attempts at explanation, it must be noted that a thorough investigation
focused on this particular question is necessary before a completely satis-
fying answer can be given.
author still argued that the technique did protect local citizens from insolvent or
illegal operations. Ladd, supra note 136, at 305. Solvent enterprises, it was thought,
would be estopped to deny their noncompliance, and there would be no need to sue
individual associates. Insolvent enterprises would be deterred from entering the state
by the fear that associates would be held personally liable. But courts often rejected
the first argument in the most aggravated cases. See American Soap Co. v. Bogue,
114 Ohio St. 149, 150 N.E. 743 (1926). And the first argument could not be per-
suasive so long as courts were unwilling to restrict a creditor to an action against
the corporation in the first instance. See Joseph T. Ryerson & Son v. Shaw, 277
Ill. 524, 115 N.E. 650 (1917).
143 See note 133 supra.
144 In Marian Realty Co. v. Cibel, 321 Mass. 480, 73 N.E.2d 902 (1947), a
landlord brought suit against a corporation's president for rent the corporation had
failed to pay during a period of noncompliance. A statute declared officers liable
on contracts "so long as such failure [to domesticate] continues." Recovery was
allowed, although the statute permitted the defect to be cured by subsequent com-
pliance and the corporation had complied; the court said liability was fixed as of the
time of the transaction. A sounder ground for this decision might have been that
the lease was made between the landlord and the president personally, without
agreement or apparent intent to look exclusively to the corporation for the rent
upon its later domestication. In the other case, McGuire v. Outdoor Life Publishing
Co., 311 Ill. App. 267, 35 N.E.2d 817 (1941), the court reluctantly held the officers
of a foreign corporation liable to a former employee for damages for breach of an
employment contract because the contract was entered into prior to an enactment
designed to reverse the state's personal liability rule. See also the following cases
which arose from the extension of credit in Arkansas to a defectively incorporated
association and involved the personal liability of the "de facto" corporation's share-
holders who resided outside the state: Whitaker v. Mitchell Mfg. Co., 219 Ark.
779, 244 S.W. 2d 965 (1952); Doggrell v. Great So. Box Co., 206 F.2d 671 (6th
Cir.), rev'd on rehearihq, 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Paper Prod. Co. v. Doggrell,
195 Tenn. 581, 261 S.W.2d 127 (1953).
145 See generally Feuer, Liabilities of Directors and Officers, 5 N.Y.L.F. 235,
276-77 (1959).
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V. CURABILITY OF DEFECTS BY SUBSEQUENT DOMESTICATION
As has been indicated, a number of the early statutes controlling the
domestication of foreign corporations declared their contracts and acts
prior to compliance wholly void.146 Whether or not they were interpreted
as preventing enforcement by both parties, it was generally conceded that
insofar as the corporation could not sue on such a contract, it could never
put itself in a position to do so by later acts.14 7 The corporation "being an
outlaw at the beginning of the case . . must so continue throughout." 
148
Where the statute declared that no suit could be maintained on contracts
made by a noncomplying foreign corporation, the same result obtained.
14 9
Today a majority of the states provide that a corporation's compliance
with the domestication statute will cure any disability that might other-
wise be imposed.150 The language used differs 151 but the intent does not-
the strongest deterrent 152 to doing local business illegally can be removed
146 See note 56 sutpra.
147 E.g., Republic Power & Serv. Co. v. Gus Blass Co., 165 Ark. 163, 263 S.W.
785 (1924); Perkins Mfg. Co. v. Clinton Constr. Co., 211 Cal. 228, 295 Pac. 1
(1930).
148 Amalgamated Zinc & Lead Co. v. Bay State Zinc Mining Co., 221 Mo. 7, 18,
120 S.W. 31, 35 (1909).
149 E.g., United Lead Co. v. J. W. Reedy Elevator Mfg. Co., 222 Ill. 199, 78
N.E. 567 (1906); E. C. Vogt, Inc. v. Ganley Bros., 185 Minn. 442, 242 N.W. 338
(1932). In Hutterian Brethren v. Haas, 116 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mont. 1953), the
relevant statute provided that no contract was enforceable until the corporation com-
plied. This was construed to mean compliance was a condition precedent to doing
business, not to bringing suit. The latter construction was rejected as "a flat con-
tradiction." The court distinguished other cases allowing subsequent compliance to
cure the disability on the ground that Montana's statute also contained penal pro-
visions which labelled the conduct a misdemeanor. This suggested to the court that
the conduct was prohibited. This analysis is not generally followed, see note 66 srupra
and accompanying text. One case carried the prohibition against suit to an extreme
for which the only explanation is an oversolicitude for a state agency. In Newell Con-
tracting Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 195 Miss. 395, 15 So. 2d 700 (1943), on a
suit to collect for extra work required by the state on a highway construction con-
tract, plaintiff's domestication when the work was two-thirds done was not allowed
to cure the disability to sue, this despite the fact that noncompliance was first raised
as a defense after the case had been pending for three years and plaintiff, after twenty
days of taking testimony, had rested its case.
150 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 6801; NEv. REv. STAT. § 80.170 (1957); see Un-
licensed Foreign Corporations-Enforceinent of Contracts, 20 CoRP. J. 223 (1953). An
interesting example of the effect of such legislation is provided by the Pittsburgh
Constr. Co. litigation. The company had been barred in a federal court from main-
taining suit on a contract. Pittsburgh Constr. Co. v. West Side Belt R.R., 154 Fed.
929 (3d Cir. 1907). After compliance and a change of Pennsylvania law the state
court held the defect to be cured and permitted the suit. Pittsburgh Constr. Co. v.
West Side Belt R.R., 227 Pa. 90, 75 AtI. 1029 (1910), aff'd, 219 U.S. 92 (1911).
151 No suit may be maintained on intrastate transactions, e.g., "until" compliance,
CAL. CORP. CODE § 6801, "unless" domestication occurs before trial, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-154(a) (1960), "without having complied," W. VA. CODE ANDN. § 3091 (1955),
or "so long as" there is a failure to comply, ME. REv. STAT. ANXN. ch. 53, § 128
(1954). Statutory changes in "style or phraseology" have been held to work no
substantive change in the right to cure the disability. Compare Outdoor Elec.
Advertising, Inc. v. Saurage, 207 La. 344, 21 So. 2d 375 (1945) ("unless and until'),
and Swift & Co. v. Little, 28 R.I. 108, 65 AtI. 615 (1907) ("unless"), with J. R.
Watkins Co. v. Floyd, 119 So. 2d 164 (La. Ct. App. 1960) ("unless"), and Garst v.
Canfield, 44 R.I. 220, 116 Atl. 482 (1922) ("so long as").
152 See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
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before final judgment is entered, and the offending corporation can benefit
from these transactions. 153 It is common to find courts labelling these
provisions as creating a "plea in abatement" 154 or a "dilatory exception" 115
or as "suspending the remedy." 156 Among the more common explana-
tions for such provisions are those which stress the injustice imposed on
a corporation by an absolute bar 157 and those which see the domestication
law as an attempt to place foreign corporations on a par with domestic ones
in terms of availability of information and amenability to process. 158
One matter regarding curability which was once a source of conflict
is the interpretation of the word "maintain" in the prohibitory statutes. 159
Although infrequently a court still construes this to mean "begin" or "in-
itiate" suit,160 it is generally held to its literal meaning, that upon the plea
of noncompliance being entered the suit can no longer be "maintained," but
that it may be freely instituted.161  Several consequences may follow from
this interpretation. For one, foreign corporations may be encouraged to do
intrastate business while undomesticated, assuming the risk that if they
eventually need the services of the local courts they may have to pay a
penalty and accrued fees.'6 The disability need be of concern only if it is
invoked in litigation. For another, a statute which merely defers the time
of trial and provides the local citizen with no substantive defense against a
foreign corporation is not likely to be invoked with regularity. Such a
statute fails as a weapon when the state delegates its enforcement to de-
fendants, since they cannot be relied upon to abate suits if delay is not in
their best interests. Thus corporate offenders, both the crafty and the
153 No state provides that subsequent compliance absolves the corporation of
penalties. Indeed, some require the payment of back fines before compliance. See
statutes cited note 162 infra.
154 Leonard Advertising Co. v. Flagg, 128 Me. 433, 148 Atl. 561 (1930).
155 Outdoor Elec. Advertising, Inc. v. Saurage, 207 La. 344, 21 So. 2d 375 (1945).
This phrase, of course, is unique to Louisiana's civil law practice.
15 6 Niblack v. Seaberg Hotel Co., 42 N.M. 281, 76 P.2d 1156 (1938).
157 Protective Fin. Corp. v. Glass, 100 NJ.L. 85, 125 Atl. 879 (Sup. Ct. 1924);
see Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 737, 746 (1950).
158 E.g., Hill-Lanham, Inc. v. Lightview Dev. Corp., 163 F. Supp. 475 (D.D.C.
1957); cf. Humphry v. City Nat'l Bank, 190 Ind. 293, 130 N.E. 273 (1921). The
common acceptance of posttransaction curability is suggested by recent decisions which
do not even bother to offer any explanation. See, e.g., Ammann v. St. Joe Paper Co.,
341 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
159 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 218.
160 See Hutterian Brethren v. Haas, 116 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mont. 1953) (dictum).
161 See Hill-Lanham, Inc. v. Lightview Dev. Corp., 163 F. Supp. 475 (D.D.C.
1957); Ward Land & Stock Co. v. Mapes, 147 Cal. 747, 82 Pac. 426 (1905);
Burton v. Oliver Farm Equip. Sales Co., 121 Fla. 148, 163 So. 468 (1935) ; National
Fertilizer Co. v. Fall River Five Cents Say. Bank, 196 Mass. 458, 82 N.E. 671 (1907).
In Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State ex rel. .Transradio Press Serv., Inc., 53
So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1951), plaintiff successfully ran out and filed for domestication when
its noncompliance was pleaded at trial.
162 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 6801; Onio RFv. CODE ANN. § 1703.29 (Page
1954). It is clear that the majority of business activities of any corporation never
come to litigation. On the other hand, the assessment of risk must also include
possible penal provisions imposed for carrying on unlicensed corporate activity. See
note 133 supra and accompanying text.
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inadvertent, may remain undetected indefinitely-the desired information
unobtained and revenue lost. There is no ready resolution of the desire
to be fair to foreign corporations by allowing subsequent compliance to
cure defects and the necessity to stimulate the uncovering of noncompliance
by making the plea of noncompliance attractive.163 One answer might be
to give private litigants bonuses for detecting noncomplying corporations.
This could be done by building on those provisions that allow noncompliance
to be pleaded in abatement and require back fees and penalties to be paid
as a prerequisite to domestication. Defendants who have forced compliance
by their abating plea could be given a percentage of the accrued amounts.
Such a reward would strike a balance between the two competing objectives,
although paying a gratuity to defendants in civil suits might seem objec-
tionable to some. Obviously it is novel to pay, in effect, a subsidy to de-
fendants, but if the payment is viewed as a reward for uncovering law-
breakers within the state, it is no more startling than any other reward
for the apprehension of criminals or the provisions for treble damages
under the federal antitrust laws.
164
An important question in the application of subsequent compliance
statutes is the period within which such compliance will be effective. Thus,
where by statute no suit was permitted on any cause of action "so long as"
there was noncompliance, the time of accrual of the cause of action was
the governing factor, and suit was allowed for overpayment on a contract
made before compliance, because the overpayment was not discovered until
the time of settlement-which was after compliance. 165 Similarly, a contract
was upheld against a charge of invalidity where the corporation conducted
no business in the state prior to entering into the contract and compliance
followed the contract by little more than a month.166 In the preceding
examples, the defendant evidently suffered no prejudice from the cor-
poration's tardiness in complying. The corporation may not expect lenity
if it postpones compliance so long that the defendant is likely to be incon-
venienced. Thus, in E. & G. Theatre Co. v. Greene,167 the corporation was
granted eighteen days to act or face dismissal, and upon its failure the
163 Against the objectionable possibility that just obligations might be avoided
if noncompliance were an affirmative defense must be weighed the administrative
impossibility of having the state primarily responsible for detecting corporate in-
truders. The practical difficulties inherent in state enforcement have led to the
reliance on litigants, through the maintenance-of-suit disability, to enforce the
domestication laws.
164 Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
165 Peoples Wet Wash Laundry Co. v. Dubeau, 80 N.H. 544, 119 Atl. 706 (1923).
166 Will v. City of Bismarck, 36 N.D. 570, 589, 163 N.W. 550, 556 (1917);
cf. Jamison v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 60 Ariz. 308, 317-18, 136 P.2d 265, 269 (1943),
in which mortgagee domesticated shortly before taking title to property following
default on loans made by the mortgagee while still undomesticated. The Jamison
court followed Woodward v. Fox W. Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz. 251, 260, 284 Pac.
350, 353 (1930), which held that a lease executed by a then domesticated foreign
corporation was not affected by the fact that compliance came after the negotia-
tions leading to the making of the lease.
167216 Mass. 171, 103 N.E. 301 (1913).
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affirming court stated that "in view of its persistent refusal to abide by the
requirements of our law it must suffer the consequence . . . and cannot
avail itself of the benefit of our court." 168
VII. CONCLUSION
The picture of state control of undomesticated foreign corporations
presents anything but a uniform pattern for analysis. State legislatures and
courts have built their systems through a trial and error process of penaliza-
tion and toleration, of rigidity and flexibility-with an occasional loan from
a neighboring sovereign. Old laws have cluttered the statute books, work-
ing in some cases to impede and in others to enhance the development of
an internally consistent policy. Some states seem to have had no unified
policy over the years. To find patterns or trends within this maze is
conjectural at best, and those seemingly discerned sometimes lack empirical
endorsement.
Considerable gloss has been added to the statutes of some states, while
others have required only occasional judicial construction. In part this
reflects no more than the incidence and volume of local commercial activity.
But this explanation fails to account for the grouping of Florida, Arkansas,
and Louisiana, with New York, Illinois, and Texas, as states with great
numbers of reported cases in this area. Other factors must be present.
One which may be suggested is that the more intricate the statute or its
use of conceptual terminology, the greater the need and demand for judicial
elaboration. Although this cannot be conclusively demonstrated, it is sup-
ported by comparing the experience of New York and Arkansas. New
York has long operated on a bare skeleton of a regulatory statute 169 and
the incidence of litigation has not been disproportionate to its importance
as a commercial center, whereas Arkansas, with a detailed statute, which
bristles with prohibitions and penalties 170-- probably reflecting a generally
more hostile attitude toward foreign corporations-has had a thriving
volume of litigation. On the other hand, New Jersey's retaliatory
statute, 1 requiring the courts to apply both New Jersey law and whatever
harsher law may be in force in the state where the offending corporation
is incorporated, has not spawned an inordinate amount of litigation.
The initial determinant in all noncompliance situations is the presence
or absence of intrastate activity. Despite occasional crystallizations of
specifics, either by statute or by settled judicial interpretation, this area
remains extremely unpredictable. However, the uncertainties of the "doing
business" concept apparently have not given rise to the application of
168 Id. at 174, 103 N.E. at 302. Despite the sharp words accompanying the
dismissal it is unclear whether the plaintiff would be barred from bringing an action
after compliance.
169 N.Y. GEN. CoRe. LAw §§ 210, 218-19.
170 See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-1201 to -05 (1957).
171 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:15-5 (1939) ; see Babe Kaufman Music Corp. v. Mandia,
127 N.J. Eq. 480, 13 A.2d 790 (Ch. 1940).
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different criteria among different classes of suits-contract, tort, replevin,
and so forth. The variations occur only in the categories incident to the
implementation of the statute, such as penalty collection, qualification in
order to maintain suit, and amenability to service of process. While
different criteria could be established for different kinds of actions, their
possible value is questionable, and no tendency in that direction is presently
discernible. The developments have been, and are likely to remain, largely
ad hoc.
The success of large fines, actively enforced, as a method of barring
corporate intruders is neither proven nor refuted by the evidence presently
available. But it does seem that, to the extent they could serve this function,
fines have not kept pace with inflation and the expansion of corporate
entities. In many states they are so small as to be inconsequential. If it
can be demonstrated that there is in fact a deterrent element to penalties-
though it must be recalled that some states ignore this possibility '1 2-- they
should be brought to a level commensurate with the financial resources of
offenders. A figure once established should be reviewed periodically to
see that it is still capable of achieving its purpose. Another observation
which may be made is that the efficacy of the domestication statutes is
dependent on stringent enforcement of these and other sanctions. While
the state may be unable to afford the price of rigorous initial detection, once
uncovered, the offender must be subjected to the full force of the statute.
Compliance will not be achieved through undue solicitude for the plight of
the self-styled unwitting offender, its officers, and its agents.
The maintenance-of-suit disability has apparently been the most im-
portant sanction in the enforcement of domestication statutes. This will
almost certainly continue to be true, but the frequency of its invocation is
likely to diminish in the many states where subsequent compliance can cure
defects. Since the volume of intrastate activity by foreign corporations is
unlikely to lessen, the states will have either to fall back on relatively
unused provisions or to enact new ones to protect their interests. Or, as a
deliberate choice, violators may be tolerated in the belief that their activities
within the state produce returns in other forms-such as by stimulating
vitality in the business climate of certain communities-to a degree which
outweighs the difficulties of enforcing compliance and the benefits gained
from such action.
A.J.E.
172 E.g., Colorado, New York, and Vermont, none of which provide for a monetary
penalty.
